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Abstract—Physical layer security is an emerging technique to
protect the wireless communications in the Internet of Things
(IoT). Motivated by the fact that a single IoT terminal usually
occupies a very small fraction of feedback resources, we propose
a novel secure transmission design with feedback compression to
improve the feedback resources utilization for secure communica-
tions. Specifically, we first introduce a multi-period one-feedback
(MPOF) scheme to exploit the channel temporal correlation
existing in the IoT scenarios, making the IoT terminal convey its
channel knowledge to the central controller in a more efficient
manner. Under this MPOF scheme, we then put forward a virtual
quantizer model and design a generalized fixed-rate secure on-
off transmission scheme, where the central controller adaptively
adjusts the transmission parameters in one feedback interval. By
averaging the total secrecy throughput of one feedback interval
over all the coherence periods thereof, we further characterize
the secrecy throughput of our proposed transmission scheme and
facilitate the joint optimization design of the feedback interval
length, the wiretap codes and the power allocation ratios. To
handle this non-convex problem, we develop an efficient approach
involving the block coordinate descent (BCD) algorithm and the
one-dimensional search method. Numerical results show that
when the channel temporal correlation is high, our proposed
secure transmission design achieves a significantly higher secrecy
throughput than the conventional design constrained by the same
amount of feedback resources.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, secure transmission design,
feedback compression, virtual quantization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth in wireless data usage and wireless con-
nectivity poses a huge burden on existing cellular networks and
triggers the next major evolution in wireless communications,
e.g., the fifth generation (5G) wireless, which is expected to
envision magnitudes of increase in data rates and connectivity,
along with a significant decrease in end-to-end latency and
energy consumption [1]. As 5G wireless communications hold
the potential to support an enormous number of connected
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devices, the Internet of Things (IoT) is recognized as one of
the emerging applications that could be eventually realized
with the development of 5G technologies [2].
The IoT enables any physical device with processing, com-
puting and sensorial capabilities to see, hear, think and perform
tasks by connecting it to the Internet via heterogeneous access
networks [3, 4]. This ubiquitous connectivity of IoT forms the
basic architecture of 5G networks [5]. Over time, the IoT is
expected to involve a wide range of public and private sectors
(e.g., agriculture, transportation, healthcare, and smart homes),
transforming the human-centric communications to machine-
centric communications [6]. Such a revolutionary change will
no doubt be a great tribute to the quality of our work and life.
A. Security for the Internet of Things
It is anticipated that the IoT would encompass private, com-
mercial, financial, and military applications. Any disclosure
of these sensitive information (e.g., personal privacy, trade
secrets, financial files, and military secrets) is bound to bring
serious consequences. Therefore, security is a fundamental
enabling factor in the IoT, and appropriate mechanisms need to
be established for secure communications in the context of IoT
[7]. It is noted that the large number of IoT devices generally
have limited hardware and significant energy constraints. For
these devices, the most computation and energy should be
used for executing core application and therefore, there may be
little left for supporting security [8]. Traditional cryptographic
methods need to consume a giant amount of communication
resources for key distribution and management, and thus being
inappropriate for securing the IoT.
Against this background, the physical layer security tech-
nique becomes a promising alternative to provide security for
the IoT [9, 10]. Different from cryptographic technologies im-
plemented at upper layers, physical layer security can achieve
confidentiality by exploring the randomness nature at the
physical layer. Rather than consuming some communication
resources for setting up encrypted protocols amongst legiti-
mate entities, physical layer security guarantees the message
confidentiality via channel coding techniques. Therefore, it
provides a standalone security solution without secret key
distribution and management. The seminal work in physical
layer security can be traced back to Wyner, who proposed
the fundamental wiretap model and clarified that perfect
secrecy is available without a shared secret key [11]. Since
then, numerous studies have focused on the design of signal
processing methods to enhance physical layer security, e.g.,
transmit beamforming [12, 13], cooperation techniques [14,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION 2
15], and artificial-noise-aided transmission [16, 17]. Most of
these studies have a common assumption, e.g., the channel
state information (CSI) of the legitimate receiver and/or the
eavesdropper is perfectly known at the transmitter. However,
this dependence on the perfect CSI at the transmitter (CSIT)
is a recognized obstacle to implement physical layer security
in some emerging wireless applications. Coincidentally, the
IoT is such an application. Specifically, due to the limited
feedback resources imposed by enormous IoT devices, the
CSIT is rather imprecise in the IoT scenarios, which usually
leads to a significant degradation on the achievable secrecy
performance. Therefore, to deploy physical layer security in
the IoT scenarios, it is necessary to design a secure transmis-
sion scheme that satisfies the feedback constraints while is
also capable of achieving good secrecy performance.
B. Related Work
In the literature, several studies have investigated the secure
transmission design with limited feedback overhead. Using the
artificial-noise-aided beamforming scheme, [18] investigated
the impact of quantized channel feedback on the achievable
secrecy rate for multiple antenna wiretap channels, while [19]
optimized the transmission to guarantee secrecy with quan-
tized channel feedback in Rayleigh fading channels. For the
block fading channels, [20] and [21] examined the non-trivial
tradeoff between the feedback overhead and the effective
communication resources for secure data transmission. These
studies demonstrated that the limited feedback overhead leads
to a significant decrease in the secrecy performance.
Note that the aforementioned studies [18–21] have adopted
a common assumption, e.g., the independent block fading
channels, which ignores the possible channel temporal corre-
lation among adjacent channel blocks [22, 23]. However, there
generally exists high channel temporal correlation in the IoT
scenarios, since the IoT devices usually stay still or move
slowly. Fortunately, this high channel temporal correlation is
probably not a bad thing. In particular, a good correlation
means that the channel experiences a slow change, such that
there is no need for the receiver to frequently feed back its
channel knowledge to the transmitter. In other words, the
channel temporal correlation provides the possibility to more
efficiently utilize the feedback resources via using the feedback
compression technique [24]. Motivated by this, in this work we
aim to design a secure transmission scheme for the IoT with
feedback compression, aiming to achieve secrecy performance
improvements without consuming extra feedback resources.
C. Our Contributions
In this work, we consider the downlink transmission from
the multi-antenna controller to a single-antenna actuator in a
local IoT scenario. The information flow from the transmitter
to the legitimate receiver is overheard by the randomly located
single-antenna eavesdroppers. By exploiting the benefits of
channel temporal correlation, we provide an artificial-noise-
aided secure on-off transmission design with more productive
utilization of the feedback resources. Compared to our existing
work [21], the key contributions of this work are summarized
as the following three aspects:
1) Different from the independent block fading assumption
in [21], we integrate the channel temporal correlation
into our secure transmission design to improve the
feedback resources utilization for secrecy performance
enhancement, thus applying to the IoT scenarios. In par-
ticular, the multi-period one-feedback (MPOF) scheme
is proposed to permit only one feedback for multiple
coherence periods, which facilitates a more efficient use
of the feedback resources.
2) We extend the fixed-rate secure transmission design in
[21] to a more generalized scenario. Since the MPOF
scheme leads to the CSIT increasingly outdated with
channel evolution, we need to individually construct
wiretap codes for the different coherence periods of one
feedback interval. We highlight that this challenging task
is successfully solved via establishing a virtual quantizer
model that converts the channel temporal correlation into
equivalent quantization bits.
3) We develop a new framework to characterize the secrecy
throughput of our designed transmission scheme, by
averaging the total secrecy throughput over the number
of coherence periods in one feedback interval. Since
maximizing this secrecy throughput is a mixed integer
nonlinear programming problem and difficult to handle,
we solve this optimization problem in two steps. For the
first step, a block coordinate descent (BCD) algorithm
is provided to determine the optimal wiretap codes and
power allocation ratios while fixing the feedback interval
length. And for the second step, the optimal feedback
interval length is solved by a one-dimensional search.
Numerical results demonstrate that compared to the con-
ventional scheme, our secure transmission design can achieve
a higher secrecy throughput by integrating the feedback re-
sources of multiple coherence periods. Or rather, in achieving
the same secrecy throughput, our secure transmission design
requires fewer feedback resources for CSIT acquisition when
the channel temporal correlation is good.
D. Organizations
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the considered system model and present the
basic principle of the MPOF scheme. In Section III, we put
forward a virtual quantizer model for the following theoretic
analysis. In Section IV and V, we provide the secure on-off
transmission design and characterize the maximization of the
secrecy throughput. Finally, we give our numerical simulations
in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by up-
percase and lowercase boldface letters. A circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variable z with variance 2 is
denoted as z  CN (0; 2). A Exponent-distributed random
variable x with parameter t is denoted as x  Exp(t). A
Gamma-distributed random variable y with parameters (a; b)
is denoted as y  Gamma(a; b). jj and kk represent the norm
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of scalar and vector, respectively. log2() and ln() represent
the base 2 logarithm and natural logarithm, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the typical IoT downlink transmission from
the central controller (Alice) to a legitimate actuator (Bob)
in the presence of randomly located single-antenna passive
eavesdroppers (Eves). We assume that Alice is equipped with
M antennas (M > 1), while Bob only has a single antenna.
We model the eavesdroppers’ locations to be distributed on the
infinite two-dimensional plane according to a homogeneous
Poisson point process (PPP)  of intensity . Given that
an individual IoT device can only hold a tiny trickle of
feedback resources, in this work we aim to design a new secure
transmission scheme with feedback compression to improve
the feedback resources utilization on secure communications.
Throughout this paper, we refer to the Alice-Bob link as
the main channel and the Alice-Eve link as the eavesdropper’s
channel. We assume a flat-varying rich-scattering environment.
Under this assumption, the channel coefficients in the main and
the eavesdropper’s channels are independent identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d) complex Gaussian random variables with zero
mean and unit variance during a specific coherence period.
For the k-th coherence period, we denote hi;k  CN (0; 1)
as the channel coefficient between the i-th transmit antenna at
Alice and the single received antenna at Bob, which facilitates
us to denote hk = [h1;k; h2;k;    ; hM;k] as the main channel
vector. As such, the received symbol at Bob is expressed by
yk =
q
d b hkxk + nk; (1)
where db denotes the distance between Alice and Bob, 
denotes the path-loss exponent, xk denotes the symbol vector
sent from Alice, and nk  CN
 
0; 2b

denotes the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob. Moreover, we denote
gi;j;k  CN (0; 1) as the channel coefficient between the i-th
transmit antenna at Alice and the j-th Eve, which facilitates
us to denote gj;k = [g1;j;k; g2;j;k;    ; gM;j;k] as the j-th
eavesdropper’s channel vector. Therefore, the received symbol
at the j-th Eve is expressed by
zj;k =
q
d j gj;kxk + wj;k; (2)
where dj denotes the distance between Alice and the j-th Eve,
and wj;k  CN
 
0; 2e

denotes the AWGN at the j-th Eve.
To concentrate on improving the efficiency of feedback
resources for secure communications, in this work we assume
that there is no channel estimation errors at Bob and Eves.
That is, Bob has perfect knowledge about hk, while the j-th
Eve has perfect knowledge about gj;k. Moreover, we consider
that Alice is able to acquire partial knowledge about hk with
the help of a feedback controller at Bob. However, since the
eavesdroppers perform as passive users (i.e., there are no
reverse links between Alice and Eves), Alice cannot obtain
any instantaneous knowledge about gj;k from the j-th Eve.
In previous studies, the independent block fading channel
model is often assumed for the simplicity of analysis, where
each channel realization remains constant in one block and
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Fig. 1. MPOF scheme: Up arrow (") is used to indicate the event that the
CDI feedback link is active, while horizontal arrow (!) is used to indicate
the event that the CDI feedback link is inactive.
different realizations are independent. However, this assump-
tion is unrealistic in the IoT scenarios, where the temporally-
correlated channels are the norm cases. That is, there exists
high channel correlation in the IoT scenarios. Motivated by
this, in this work we focus on exploiting the channel temporal
correlation to compress the feedback overhead for CSIT ac-
quisition, which makes possible designing secure transmission
schemes for the IoT with secrecy performance improvements.
In particular, we model the time evolution of the main channel
by a first-order Gauss-Markov process [25]
hk = hk 1 +
p
1  2ek; (3)
where  quantifies the amount of the correlation between the
elements of hk and hk 1, and ek is a random vector, whose
entries are i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables with zero
mean and unit variance.
A. MPOF Scheme
It is well known that by utilizing the channel knowledge
at Alice, the physical layer can provide great secrecy perfor-
mance. In practice, acquiring the channel knowledge at Alice
is not easy, and the common method is to employ a reverse
channel link. Specifically, at each coherence period Alice first
sends a sequence of training symbols to help Bob perform
estimation of hk. After this process, Bob obtains the channel
direction information (CDI), e.g., dk = hk=khkk, which plays
a crucial role for the signal design at Alice side. However, due
to the constrained rate of the practical reverse link, Alice can
only typically learn about the partial knowledge of dk with a
small amount of feedback overhead.
In conventional feedback scheme, Bob performs CDI quan-
tization and feeds back his quantized information to Alice
using a small number of feedback bits at every coherence
period. Although this scheme is easy to be used, it ignores
the benefits of feedback compression in temporally correlated
channels. From this perspective, we redesign the CDI feedback
scheme for secure transmission by taking account of the
channel temporal correlation. Aided by [26], we put forward a
novel feedback scheme (e.g., the MPOF scheme) to help Bob
convey back his quantized CDI for Alice’s secure transmission
design. As illustrated in Fig. 1, in this MPOF scheme the CDI
feedback link is only active at the nT -th coherence period.
Here, T is referred to as the length of feedback interval, and
n is a nonnegative integer. In particular, at the nT -th coherence
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period Bob selects the optimal quantized CDI vector from a
2B0 -sized codebook B0 = fb1;b2;    ;b2B0g known a prior
at Alice and Bob, yielding
cn = argmax
bi2B0
jdnTbyi j2: (4)
Then Bob informs Alice of the index of cn by using B0
feedback bits. For the following T   1 coherence periods,
the CDI feedback link is inactive, such that the side channel
knowledge known at Alice cannot obtain a real-time update.
That is, cn is the only CDI available at Alice during the periods
ranging from k = nT to k = (n+ 1)T   1, and Alice has to
reuse cn for data transmission until Bob sends back the index
of cn+1 at the (n+ 1)T -th coherence period.
This MPOF scheme is actually an feedback compression
scheme, and the average feedback overhead of the MPOF
scheme is B0=T bits/channel use. Here, we clarify that for
this MPOF scheme, the T coherence periods in one feedback
interval should be regraded as a whole to carry on the analysis.
As such, in the following we typically investigate the secure
transmission design for the first feedback interval, including
the coherence periods ranging from k = 0 to k = T   1.
B. Artificial-Noise-Aided Beamforming Scheme
Since we consider the passive eavesdropping scenario, the
instantaneous eavesdropper’s channel knowledge is unknown
to Alice. Under this scenario, the artificial-noise-aided beam-
forming scheme is often applied for secure communications
[19–21]. Specifically, at the 0-th coherence period, Alice
generates an M  M precoding matrix as W0 = [f0;F0],
where f0 = c
y
0, and the columns of F0 form an orthonormal
basis for the null space of c0.
For the coherence periods ranging from k = 0 to k = T 1,
theM1 transmitted symbol vector xk at Alice is designed as
xk = f0uk+F0vk, where uk is the information-bearing signal,
and vk is the artificial noise. The variance of uk is Pu;k, and
the M   1 elements of vk are i.i.d complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and variance Pv;k. By applying
this artificial-noise-aided beamforming design, the received
symbols at Bob and the j-th Eve in the k-th coherence period
become
yk =
q
d b hkf0uk +
q
d b hkF0vk + nk (5)
and
zj;k =
q
d j gj;kf0uk +
q
d j gj;kF0vk + wj;k; (6)
respectively. We consider a power constraint denoted by P =
Pu;k + (M   1)Pv;k, and define the power allocation ratio
between Pu;k and Pv;k as k = Pv;k=Pu;k, such that we have
Pu;k = P'k and Pv;k = P'kk, where 'k = 11+(M 1)k .
We clarify that k (or 'k) acts as an important transmission
parameter to guarantee good secrecy performance.
III. VIRTUAL QUANTIZATION
In this section, we first review the frequently-used design
criterion for the optimization of quantization codebook. By
combining this criterion with the MPOF scheme, we success-
fully transform the channel temporal correlation as a virtual
reverse feedback link, which enables us to perform the secure
transmission design under the MPOF scheme.
A. Quantization Cell Approximation
In the literature, the optimization of quantization codebook
B has been thoroughly studied. Albeit starting from different
perspectives, [27] and [28] presented the same criterion for
optimal codebook design, i.e., minimizing the maximum cor-
relation between any pair of beamforming vectors. This design
problem is actually well known in applied mathematics as the
Grassmannian line packing problem [29, 30]. Mathematically,
by modeling the codebook B as a collection of lines in the
Euclidean space CM , the optimal codebook is equivalent to
Bopt = min
B2CM2B
max
1i<j2B
D(bi;bj); (7)
where B is the number of quantization bits, D(bi;bj) =
cos2(i;j), and i;j is the angle between the two lines gen-
erated by bi and bj .
However, the design of optimal or near-optimal Grass-
mannian line packings is usually a challenging problem and
can only be numerically determined in general. To further
examine the quantization performance, [29, 31] introduced an
approximate method to characterize the codebook generated
by this criterion. This approximation ideally assumes that each
quantization cell can be viewed as a Voronoi region of a
spherical cap. In particular, given the designed codebook B,
the actual quantization cell
R =
n
d : jdbyi j2  jdbyj j; 8j 6= i
o
(8)
is approximated as
R =
n
d : jdbyi j2  1  "
o
; (9)
where " = 2 
B
M 1 . The above quantization cell approximation
has been widely used as a valid performance indicator for the
well-designed codebook.
B. Virtual Quantizer Model
In this work, we also adopt this quantization cell approxi-
mation to perform analytical characterization. Specifically, at
the 0-th coherence period, Bob performs CDI quantization by
selecting the optimal vector from the designated codebook
B0, i.e., c0 = argmaxbi2B0 jd0byi j2. If we define cos20 =
jd0cy0j2, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of cos20
is approximated as [21, Eq. (6)]
Fcos20 (x) =

0; 0  x < 1  "0;
1  ( 1 x"0 )M 1; 1  "0  x  1;
(10)
where "0 = 2 
B0
M 1 denotes the maximum quantization error
of using codebook B0.
In the MPOF scheme, c0 is used to perform data trans-
mission during the T coherence periods of one feedback
interval. Since there exists the temporal correlation between
h0 and hk (1  k  T   1), we believe that c0 is not
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Fig. 2. The illustration of the virtual quantizer’s quantization error increasing
with the evolution of the main channel.
independent of dk. That is, despite that for the following
T 1 periods Bob does not perform the real-time quantization,
we can still view c0 as a virtual output of Bob’s quantizing
dk with a reduced-resolution codebook, as shown in Fig. 2.
Since the output of this virtual quantizer is restricted to be
c0, this virtual quantization is different from the real-time
quantization. Admittedly, when the time-evolution error is
large, it is not always the best option to quantize dk as c0.
However, since the temporal correlation in the IoT scenarios
is typically high, the probability of the output of our virtual
quantization being c0 is actually substantial. Based on this
nature, we approximate the CDF of cos2 k = jdkcy0j2 as the
similar form with (10)
Fcos2k (x) =

0; 0  x < 1  "k;
1  ( 1 x"k )M 1; 1  "k  x  1:
(11)
Here, the maximum quantization error of this virtual quantizer
is facilitated as "k = 2 
Bk
M 1 , where Bk denotes the number
of the virtual quantization bits. The following lemma charac-
terizes the mathematical relationship between "k and "0.
Lemma 1: The parameter "k in (11) is formulated as
"k = 1  2k (1  "0) : (12)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Aided by (11), we successfully establish a framework to
model the channel temporal correlation as a virtual quantizer.
That is, although we adopt the MPOF scheme for CSIT acqui-
sition, we can still think that there always exists a quantizer
available at Bob. However, the quantization performance of
this virtual quantizer gradually decreases in one feedback
interval, indicated by (12). We highlight that this virtual
quantizer acts as an important analyzing tool for us to design
the secure transmission scheme with feedback compression.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
In this section, we attempt to design an on-off-based secure
transmission scheme that applies to the MPOF scheme. Specif-
ically, aided by the statistical characterizations for the received
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs) in the main
and eavesdropping channels, we first propose a generalized
fixed-rate secure on-off transmission design, and then develop
the closed-form expression for the secrecy throughput under
our designed secure transmission scheme.
A. Statistical Characterization of the SINRs
In preparation for the secure transmission design, we first
focus on characterizing the statistics of the received SINRs at
Bob and Eves.
1) The Received SINR at Bob: Based on (5), the actual
instantaneous received SINR at Bob during the k-th coherence
period is given by

b;k
=
Pb'kjhkf0j2
Pb'kkkhkF0k2 + 1
; (13)
where Pb = Pd b =
2
b . By substituting jdkf0j2 = cos2k and
kdkF0k2 = sin2k into (13), we rewrite b;k as
b;k =
Pb'kkhkk2cos2k
Pb'kkkhkk2sin2k + 1
: (14)
Using the method presented in [21, 31], we derive the CDF of
b;k as
Fb;k(x) =

F1(x); x  	^t;k;
F2(x); x < 	^t;k;
(15)
where
F1(x) = 1  M 1k e 
x
Pb'k ; (16)
and
F2(x) = FX(k)  M 1k e 
x
Pb'k FY (k): (17)
Here, 	^t;k = 1 "k"kk , k =
1
"k(1+kx)
, k =
x=(Pb'k)
1 "k "kkx , X 
Gamma(M   1; 1), and Y  Gamma(M   1; k). By taking
the second-order derivative, it is easy to find that F1(x) is a
concave function, while F2(x) is a convex function in the
region of [0; ~	t;k) but a concave function in the region of
( ~	t;k; 	^t;k), where ~	t;k is the inflection point of F2(x) and
can be numerically determined. These facts can be observed
in Fig. 3, which illustrates Fb;k(x) for different values of k.
2) The Received SINRs at Eves: Based on (6), the actual
instantaneous received SINR at the j-th Eve during the k-th
coherence period is expressed by
j;k =
Pe'kjgj;kf0j2
Pe'kkkgj;kF0k2 + dj
; (18)
where Pe = P=2e , jgj;kf0j2  Exp(1), and kgj;kF0k2 
Gamma(M 1; 1). Conditioned on the fixed k and d j , the
CDF of j;k is derived as
Fj;k
 
xjd j

= 1  (1 + kx)1 Me 
xdj
Pe'k : (19)
Note that the eavesdropper with maximum received SINR
has the strongest eavesdropping ability, such that we need to
characterize the statistic of e;k = maxj2 j;k. In particular,
we use the mathematical method proposed in [32] and derive
the CDF of e;k as
Fe;k (x) = e
  '

k
x(1+kx)
M 1 ; (20)
where  = 2=, and  =   (+ 1)Pe .
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B. Wiretap Codes Design
To perform the secure communications, the crucial thing is
to determine suitable values for the wiretap code parameters,
e.g., the codeword transmission rate Rt and the rate redun-
dancy Re, respectively [11]. Since the CSIT varies with chan-
nel evolution in one feedback interval, we need to construct
two code parameter vectors, e.g., Rt = [Rt;1; Rt;2;    ; Rt;T ]
and Re = [Re;1; Re;2;    ; Re;T ]. That is, T sets of code pair
(Rt;k; Re;k) should be designed. We clarify that the T sets of
code pair hold constant across the whole transmission and ap-
ply to each feedback interval. For the convenience of following
derivations, we denote Rt;k and Re;k by Rt;k = log2(1+	t;k)
and Re;k = log2(1 + 	e;k), respectively.
It is worth mentioning that if we focus on one feedback
interval, our transmission design looks like an adaptive-rate
scheme. However, if we take one feedback interval as a unit
and examine this design over the whole transmission process,
it is indeed a fixed-rate scheme. Or rather, it is a generalized
fixed-rate scheme. We highlight that this generalized fixed-
rate design still has the advantage of low complexity and thus
suitably applies to the IoT scenarios.
C. Secure On-Off Scheme
Under this generalized fixed-rate design, the on-off scheme
is a natural choice to perform secure transmission. Therefore,
we apply the on-off scheme into our considered scenario by
only allowing the message transmission to happen when the
legitimate channel capacity exceeds the predetermined code-
word transmission rate. In particular, for the k-th coherence
period, the transmission probability is facilitated as
ptm;k = PrfCb;k  Rt;kg; (21)
where Cb;k= log2(1 + b;k) is the Bob’s channel capacity in
the k-th coherence period. Aided by the CDF of b;k in (15),
the transmission probability of the k-th coherence period is
derived as
ptm;k =

1  F1(	t;k); 	t;k  	^t;k;
1  F2(	t;k); 	t;k < 	^t;k: (22)
We clarify that in each coherence period Bob needs to convey
back an extra bit to identify the on/off state of the transmission.
However, compared to the feedback bits for CDI quantization,
this 1-bit overhead is so small that it is omitted in this work.
Since we consider the passive eavesdropping scenario, the
perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed all the time. When
the transmission condition is met and yet the designed rate
redundancy falls below the channel capacity of the strongest
eavesdropper, the leakage of confidential information would
occur. This is the so-called secrecy outage event, and the
probability of this event, e.g., secrecy outage probability, is
a widely used metric to characterize the security level [19,
21]. In this work, we express the secrecy outage probability
of the k-th coherence period as
pso;k = PrfCe;k  Re;kjtransmissiong; (23)
where Ce;k= log2(1 + e;k) is the maximum Eve’s channel
capacity in the k-th coherence period. Due to the fixed-rate de-
sign in this work, it is easy to find that the secrecy outage event
is actually independent of the transmission condition, such
that (23) can be simply rewritten as pso;k = Prfe;k  	e;kg.
Aided by the CDF of e;k in (19), we derive pso;k as
pso;k = 1  Fe(	e;k) = 1  e
  '

k
	

e;k
(1+k	e;k)
M 1
: (24)
In the literature works, the secrecy throughput, defined as
the average secrecy rate over all the channel realizations, is
often taken as the optimization goal to optimize the code
parameters, subject to a required secrecy outage probability
[33]. For our considered scenario, the secrecy throughput of
the k-th coherence period can be written as
k = ptm;k(Rt;k  Re;k): (25)
However, for the T coherence periods of one feedback interval,
different coherence periods have different secrecy throughput
performance. As such, the secrecy throughput of our newly
designed secure transmission scheme should be redefined by
averaging the total secrecy throughput of one feedback interval
over T coherence periods, yielding
mpof =
1
T
T 1X
k=0
k =
1
T
T 1X
k=0
ptm;k(Rt;k  Re;k): (26)
In the following section, we focus on how to determine optimal
T ,	t = [	t;1;	t;2;    ;	t;T ],	e = [	e;1;	e;2;    ;	e;T ],
and  = [1; 2;    ; T ] maximizing the secrecy throughput
in (26) subject to a given secrecy outage constraint.
V. SECRECY THROUGHPUT MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we demonstrate that the optimization prob-
lem of maximizing the secrecy throughput can be solved
via two steps. Specifically, we first fix T and determine the
corresponding optimal 	t, 	e, and  by designing a BCD
algorithm. Then we develop a BCD-based one-dimensional
search method to tackle the optimal T .
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A. Problem Formulation
Problem 1: The joint optimization of T , 	t, 	e, and 
maximizing the secrecy throughput under a given secrecy
outage constraint can be formulated as
max
T;	t;	e;
mpof(T;	t;	e;); (27a)
s.t. pso    1; (27b)
	t  	e; (27c)
where pso = [pso;1; pso;2;    ; pso;T ], and  denotes the re-
quired secrecy outage constraint. We clarify that the constraint
(27b) results from the secrecy outage requirement, and the
constraint (27c) guarantees a positive secrecy rate.
Note that Problem 1 is a typical mixed integer nonlinear
programming (MINLP) problem, and few effective algorithms
can be used to efficiently solve it. To facilitate an effective
method for handling this problem, in this work we carry on
the following equivalent transformation
max
T;	t;	e;
mpof , max
T
max
	t;	e;
mpof : (28)
This transformation implies that we can decompose the entire
optimization into two steps: We maximize mpof by first
maximizing over variables 	t, 	e, and  subject to a fixed
T , and then over the integer variable T . In the following, we
perform the optimization procedures step by step.
B. BCD Algorithm Design for Solving the First Problem
In the first step, we aim to address the following problem.
Problem 2: For a fixed T , what are the optimal 	t, 	e,
and  that maximize mpof under a given secrecy outage
constraint? This problem is formulated as
max
	t;	e;
mpof(	t;	e;); (29a)
s.t. (27b) and (27c): (29b)
Before proceeding to solve Problem 2, we first transform
the constraint in (27b) into a more explicit form. In particular,
due to the monotonicity of Fe;k(x), we obtain
pso;k   , 	e;k  F 1e;k(1  ); (30)
where F 1e;k() denotes the inverse function of Fe;k(). For
ease of notation, we define (k) = F 1e;k(1  ).
Since ptm;k is independent of 	e;k, (26) implies that to
maximize mpof , 	e;k should be set to its minimum value,
e.g., 	e;k = (k). Here, we clarify that although (k) is an
implicit function of k, we can still calculate it by numerically
searching the unique root of Fe;k(x) = 1    subject to an
arbitrary k. As such, we simplify Problem 2 as
max
	t;
mpof (	t;;	e = ()) ; (31a)
s.t. 	t  (): (31b)
Although this problem is simplified, it is still non-convex and
difficult to address. In the following, we propose an efficient
BCD algorithm to solve this joint optimization problem [20].
Specifically, we decouple all the optimization variables into
two blocks, e.g., f	tg and fg, and alternatively optimize one
block of variables by fixing the other block of variables at their
values from the last iteration. Each iteration of the proposed
algorithm involves solving two subproblems as follows.
1) Subproblem 1: In each iteration procedure, we first in-
tend to optimize 	t subject to  by considering the following
problem
max
	t
mpof(	t;): (32)
By observing the expression for mpof in (26), we find that
the maximization of mpof can be facilitated by respectively
maximizing its general term, e.g., k. Moreover, in the term
of k, 	t;k is merely coupled with k, which implies that we
only need to characterize the maximization of k to determine
the optimal 	t;k with a fixed k.
Note that (27c) leads to a natural constraint on 	t;k, e.g.,
	t;k  (k). In this subsection, we focus on the most
complex case, e.g., (k) < ~	t;k, and discuss how to find
the optimal 	t;k by dividing the feasible region of 	t;k into
three parts, e.g., [(k); ~	t;k], [ ~	t;k; 	^t;k], and [	^t;k;1). It
is worth mentioning that other cases are simpler than this, and
they can also be solved using the method presented below.
Considering the first region, e.g., [(k); ~	t;k], the expres-
sion for k can be formulated as
k =
1  F2(	t;k)
ln 2
ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

: (33)
By taking the first-order derivative of k in (33) on 	t;k, we
formulate A(	t;k) = @k=@	t;k as
A(	t;k) =  f2(	t;k)
ln 2
ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

+
1  F2(	t;k)
ln 2  (1 + 	t;k) ;
(34)
where f2() is the derivative function of F2(). Since F2()
is a convex function in the region of [0; ~	t;k], we state that
f2() is an increasing function of 	t;k. As such, the first term
in the right-hand side (RHS) of (34) is a decreasing function
of 	t;k. Aided by the monotonicity of the second term in the
RHS of (34), we find that A(	t;k) is a decreasing function of
	t;k in the region of [0; ~	t;k].
Note that A(0) > 0, but A( ~	t;k) varies. Under the case with
A( ~	t;k)  0, A(	t;k)  0 always holds true, indicating that
k monotonically increases with 	t;k, and thus the maximum
is achieved at 	t;k = ~	t;k. Under the case with A( ~	t;k) < 0,
A(	t;k) is first positive then negative, indicating that k first
increases then decreases with 	t;k, and thus the maximum is
achieved at the unique root of A(	t;k) = 0. As such, in the
region of [0; ~	t;k], the optimal 	t;k maximizing k can be
expressed by
	optt;k;1 =

~	t;k; A( ~	t;k)  0;
	?t;k; A(
~	t;k) < 0;
(35)
where 	?t;k satisfies A(	
?
t;k) = 0, and can be calculated by
using the bisection method.
Considering the second region, e.g., [ ~	t;k; 	^t;k], the ex-
pressions for k and @k=@	t;k can also be formulated as
(33) and (34), respectively. However, since F2() becomes
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a concave function in the region of [ ~	t;k; 	^t;k], the mono-
tonicity of A(	t;k) is no longer easy to judge. In addition,
the complicated expression for A(	t;k) makes it impossible
to mathematically characterize its monotonicity. Fortunately,
since the size of the second region is small, we can directly
adopt the one-dimensional search method to determine the
optimal 	t;k maximizing k, which is referred to as 	
opt
t;k;2.
Considering the third region, e.g., [	^t;k;1), the expression
for k can be formulated as
k =
1  F1(	t;k)
ln 2
ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

: (36)
By taking the first-order derivative of k in (36) on 	t;k, we
formulate B(	t;k) = @k=@	t;k as
B(	t;k) =  f1(	t;k)
ln 2
ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

+
1  F1(	t;k)
ln 2  (1 + 	t;k) ;
(37)
where f1() is the derivative function of F1(). Aided by the
expression for F1() in (16), we can further derive (37) as
B(	t;k) =
"1 Mk e
  	t;kPb'kH(	t;k)
ln 2  (1 + k	t;k)M
; (38)
where H(	t;k) is expressed by
H(	t;k) =
1 + k	t;k
1 + 	t;k
  1 + k	t;k
Pb'k
ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

  (M   1)k ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

: (39)
Since the sign of B(	t;k) follows that of H(	t;k), the
monotonicity of k can be examined by analyzing the sign
of H(	t;k). Aided by (39), it is not hard to find that when
k  1 holds true1, H(	t;k) is a decreasing function of 	t;k.
Note that H(1) < 0, but H(	^t;k) varies. If H(	^t;k)  0,
H(	t;k)  0 always holds true, i.e., k monotonically
decreases with 	t;k, such that the maximum is achieved at
	t;k = 	^t;k. However, if H(	^t;k) > 0, H(	t;k) is first
positive then negative. That is, k first increases then decreases
with 	t;k, and the maximum is achieved at the unique root of
H(	t;k) = 0. As such, in the region of [	^t;k;1), the optimal
	t;k maximizing k can be expressed by
	optt;k;3 =
(
	^t;k; H(	^t;k)  0;
	t;k; H(	^t;k) > 0;
(40)
where 	t;k satisfies H(	

t;k) = 0, and can be calculated by
using the bisection method. In terms of the search bound, e.g.,
[a; b], we use a = 	^t;k and preassign the right bound as b =
a + 10. Then we check if H(a)H(b) < 0 holds true. If not,
we double the value of b until H(a)H(b) < 0 is satisfied.
Based on the above analysis, the optimal 	t;k maximizing
k with a fixed k is given by
	optt;k = argmax
	t;k2f	optt;k;1;	optt;k;2;	optt;k;3g
k(	t;k): (41)
Aided by (41), we clarify that the optimal 	t subject to a
fixed  can be determined.
1We clarify that k  1 guarantees Pv;k  Pu;k , thus limiting the
artificial noise leaked into the main channel in a certain range. That is, k  1
is a natural and reasonable choice to design the secure transmission scheme.
2) Subproblem 2: In each iteration procedure, we then in-
tend to optimize  subject to 	t by considering the following
problem
max

mpof(	t;): (42)
Similarly, we characterize the optimal k with a fixed 	t;k by
maximizing k. To clarify, we temporarily put the constraint
k  1 aside to ease the difficulty of finding solution, but
this relaxation does not mean that we ignore this constraint.
Instead, we add this constraint on the final solution, such that
k  1 still holds true.
To guarantee (27c) holds true, k should be restricted to be
larger than k, where 

k is the solution of (k) = 	t;k.
In this subsection, we also focus on the most complex case,
e.g., k < 

k, where 

k = ("
 1
k   1)=	t;k. In the following,
we discuss how to find the optimal k by dividing its feasible
region into two parts, e.g., [k; 

k] and [

k;1).
For the first region, e.g., [k; 

k], 	t;k < 	^t;k holds true.
Under this case, the expression for k can be formulated as
(33), which enables us to derive C(k) = @k=@k as
C(k) =  fX (k)  0k(k)  M 1k e 
x
Pbk g(k); (43)
where

0
k(k) =
	t;k
Pb
(M   1)(1  "k) + "k	t;k
(1  "k   "kk	t;k)2
; (44)
and
g(k) =

(M   1)k
1 + k	t;k
+
1
Pbk

FY (k)  fY (k)  0k(k):
(45)
Although we can obtain the closed-form expression of C(k),
it is difficult to further characterize its monotonicity due to
the complicated expression of g(k). Fortunately, we observe
that the size of the first region is small, and thus using the
one-dimensional search method to find the optimal k is
acceptable. We refer to the optimal k in the first region as
optk;1 .
For the second region, e.g., [k;1), 	t;k  	^t;k holds
true, and k can be formulated as (36). By taking the first-
order derivative of k on k, we derive G(k) = @k=@k
as
G(k) =
"1 Mk e
  	t;kPb'k J(k)
ln 2  k(1 + k	t;k)M 1
; (46)
where J(k) is expressed by
J(k) =  
0
(k)k
1 + (k)
  (M   1)k	t;k
1 + k	t;k
ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

  (M   1)k	t;k
Pb
ln

1 + 	t;k
1 + (k)

: (47)
To examine the monotonicity of J(k), we provide the mono-
tonicity and concavity of (k) in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: (k) is a monotonically decreasing function
and also is a convex function of k.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Aided by Lemma 2, it is easy to find that all the three terms
in the RHS of (47) are decreasing functions of k. Therefore,
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we conclude that J(k) is a decreasing function of k. Note
that J(1)  0, but J(k) varies. If J(k)  0, J(k)  0
always holds true, i.e., k monotonically decreases with k,
such that the maximum is achieved at k = k. However,
if J(k) > 0, J(k) is first positive then negative. That is,
k first increases then decreases with k, and the maximum
is achieved at the unique root of J(k) = 0. As such, in
the region of [k;1), the optimal k maximizing k can be
expressed by
optk;2 =

k; J(

k)  0;
?k; J(

k) > 0;
(48)
where ?k satisfies J(
?
k) = 0. Also, the explicit expression
for ?k is difficult to derive, and we still adopt the bisection
method to calculate it.
Based on the aforementioned discussions and the constraint
k  1, we state that the optimal k maximizing k for a
fixed 	t;k is given by
optk = argmax
k2foptk;1 ;optk;2 ;1g
k(k): (49)
Aided by (49), we state that the optimal  subject to a fixed
	t can be determined.
Algorithm 1 Proposed BCD Algorithm for Solving the Prob-
lem in Problem 2.
1: For a fixed T , calculate f"0; "1;    ; "T 1g using (12).
2: Initialize n = 1, [1] and 	t[1].
3: Set the tolerance of accuracy  > 0.
4: Calculate mpof(	t[1];[1]) according to (26).
5: repeat
6: n = n+ 1.
7: Given [n  1], obtain 	t[n] according to (41).
8: Given 	t[n], obtain [n] according to (49).
9: until The difference of the objective function in (31a) in
successive iterations is smaller than .
10: Output 	t[n], [n], and 	e[n] = ([n]).
Based on the above analysis to the two subproblems, a
BCD algorithm can be developed to iteratively optimize 	t
and , which is summarized in Algorithm 1. In regards to
the convergence of this algorithm for solving Problem 2, we
present the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The solution generated by Algorithm 1 is a
stationary point of the optimization problem in Problem 2.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
C. One-Dimensional Search for Finding the Optimal T
In this subsection, we concentrate on the second problem,
e.g., searching the optimal T maximizing mpof over its
feasible region. We first show that subject to the feedback
constraint of each coherent period, e.g., Bc, the feasible region
of T can be determined in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When we perform secure transmission under
our proposed MPOF scheme, the maximum length of feedback
interval is expressed by Tmax = m   1, where m is the
minimum integer satisfying
1  2(m 1) (1  "mc ) > "max; m 2 N; (50)
where "c = 2 
Bc
M 1 , "max = 2 
Bmin
M 1 denotes the maximum
allowable quantization error, and N denotes the set of positive
integers. Here, Bmin denotes the number of the minimum
required feedback bits.
Proof: Using the MPOF scheme, all the feedback re-
sources of T coherence periods should be assigned to B0,
e.g., B0 = BcT . Since "k gradually increases in one feedback
interval, we only need to examine the final coherence period
and ensure that "T 1 < "max always holds true2. Aided by
(12), "T 1 can be written as
"T 1 = 1  2(T 1)
 
1  "Tc

: (51)
To find the mathematical relationship between "T 1 with T ,
we define h(t) = 1   2(t 1) (1  "tc), where t 2 [1;1). As
such, "T 1 can be analyzed via examining the monotonicity of
h(t). Specifically, we take the first derivative of h(t), yielding
h
0
(t) = 2(t 1)
 
"tc ln
 
2"c
  ln 2 : (52)
Aided by (52), we present the following discussions.
 Case 1: "c ln
 
2"c
  ln 2. Under this case, h0(t)  0
always holds true for t  1, and thus h(t) is an increasing
function in the feasible region of t 2 [1;1).
 Case 2: "c ln
 
2"c

< ln 2. Under this case, h
0
(t) is first
negative then positive, indicating that h(t) first decreases
then increases as t increases from 1 to 1.
Given h(1) = "c < "max and h(1) = 1 > "max, we state that
in either case there is only one solution satisfying h(t) = "max.
Thus, the maximum length of feedback interval (e.g., Tmax)
can be determined by finding the minimum positive integer m
satisfying h(m) > "max, which can be formulated as
m = argmin
m
h(m)  "max; s.t. h(m) > "max: (53)
Then we have Tmax = m   1 and complete our proof.
Aided by Theorem 1, the optimization problem in the
second step can be formulated as follows.
Problem 3: Given the feedback constraint of each coherence
period, e.g., Bc, what is the optimal T that maximizes mpof
under a given secrecy outage constraint? This problem is
mathematically expressed as
max
T
mpof(T;	
opt
t ;	
opt
e ;
opt); (54a)
s.t. 1  T  Tmax; T 2 N: (54b)
In (54a), 	optt , 	
opt
e , and 
opt can be obtained via solving
Problem 2. However, since 	optt , 	opte , and opt vary with T
and are not explicit functions of T , we clarify that Problem 3
is a typical non-linear integer problem and difficult to handle.
Fortunately, we find that (54a) is merely a one-dimensional
optimization problem, and its search space is quite limited.
Motived by this, we can directly apply the one-dimensional
search method to solve this problem.
2A higher quantization error would cause serious noise leakage problem,
significantly degrading the secrecy performance.
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Fig. 4. The probability of cos2k less than 1   "k versus  with M = 4
and B0 = 6.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to corroborate
the aforementioned theoretical analysis. We first provide the
validity of our proposed virtual quantizer model in Section
III by using Monte Carlo simulations. Then we examine the
secrecy throughput performance of our new secure transmis-
sion design under the MPOF scheme, based on which we
finally characterize the performance advantage of our proposed
scheme over the conventional scheme.
A. Verification of the Virtual Quantizer Model
Note that in Section III, we establish a virtual quantizer to
transform the channel temporal correlation, which enables us
to further perform the secure transmission design under our
proposed MPOF scheme. Since this virtual quantizer occupies
such a significant position, we firstly verify its correctness
by providing Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. To clarify, in the simulation
process we directly use the codebook examples listed in [34].
For the Monte Carlo simulations, we obtain the numerical
results by averaging over 106 channel trials.
Fig. 4 plots the probability of cos2k less than 1 "k versus
 for different values of k, along which the Monte Carlo
simulations, marked by ‘’, are also provided. For a simple
notation, we define pk = Prfcos2k < 1  "kg. Note that an
ideal codebook is the one with p0 = 0. In this case, the actual
CDF of cos20 coincides with (10). However, designing an
ideal codebook is practically unreachable [29, 31], and only
a suboptimal codebook with p0 > 0 can be numerically
obtained. This helps explain why we observe from this figure
that p0 = 0:11. This observation highlights that even though
the real-time quantization is available, the widely-used CDF of
cos20 in (10) is actually an approximated expression. We also
observe that for a fixed , pk would increase as k increases.
This is not surprising since the virtual quantizer’s performance
degrades with channel evolution. However, it is a fortune that
pk merely has a minor increase when  is high. That is, pk
is still in a reasonable scope relative to p0. This observation
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Fig. 5. The CDF of cos2k with M = 4,  = 0:9, and B0 = 6.
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Fig. 6. The convergence rate of the BCD algorithm with M = 4,  = 4,
Pb = 20 dB, Pe = 0 dB,  = 0:9, Bc = 6, and Bmin = 2.
makes it possible to approximate the CDF of cos2k as (11),
which has the similar form with (10).
Fig. 5 plots the CDF of cos2k for different values of
k. In this figure, we depict the theoretic curves by using
the approximate expression in (11), and provide some Monte
Carlo simulations for verification. We observe from this figure
that when x is relatively large, the difference between the
approximate result and the numerical result is extremely minor.
This verification demonstrates that the expression for the CDF
of cos2k in (11) is a good approximation. Thus, it can be used
for performance characterization when we analyze the virtual
quantizer of the k-th coherence period. Since the theoretical
analysis for our secure transmission design builds on (11),
we highlight that this figure ensures the preciseness of our
theoretical analysis.
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Fig. 7. The secrecy throughput of different coherence periods with M = 4,
 = 4, Pb = 20 dB, Pe = 0 dB, Bc = 6, Bmin = 2, and  = 0:01.
B. Secrecy Throughput under the MPOF Scheme
We next focus on illustrating the secrecy throughput of our
proposed transmission scheme. We first examine the conver-
gence of our designed BCD algorithm in Fig. 6. Then we set
T = Tmax and individually illustrate the secrecy throughput
of different coherence periods in Fig. 7. Finally, we depict the
secrecy throughput under the MPOF scheme in Fig. 8.
Fig. 6 plots the convergence rate of our designed BCD
algorithm for different values of . We first observe that
the number of the required iteration steps is generally small,
e.g., less than 30. We also observe that the number of the
required iteration steps is influenced by . Intuitively, a higher
number of iteration steps are required when the secrecy outage
constraint becomes stricter. For example, 24 iteration steps are
needed when  = 0:02, while 27 iteration steps are needed
when  = 0:01. This figure indicates that our BCD algorithm
converges fast, and highlights its efficiency and practicality for
determining the appropriate system parameters.
Fig. 7 plots the secrecy throughput of different coherence
periods in one feedback interval. In this figure, we directly set
T = Tmax and individually illustrate the secrecy throughput
of the k-th coherence period, e.g., k. We first observe that
for the fixed  and , k decreases as k increases. This is
due to the fact the CSIT becomes less accurate with channel
evolution, leading to the reduction of the transmission prob-
ability. Moreover, this figure demonstrates that k decreases
when  increases. This is because the eavesdropping ability
grows with , degrading the secrecy performance.
Fig. 8 plots the secrecy throughput under the MPOF scheme
versus T . The curves for mpof are generated by applying
the BCD algorithm. We first observe that mpof first increases
then decreases as T increases from 1 to Tmax. This observation
indicates that there exists an optimal T (e.g., Topt) maximizing
the secrecy throughput under the MPOF scheme. Even though
the theoretical solution for Topt is difficult to find, we state
that it can be easily determined by employing a simple one-
dimensional search. We also observe that the maximum mpof
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Fig. 8. The secrecy throughput under the MPOF scheme withM = 4,  = 4,
Pb = 20 dB, Pe = 0 dB, Bc = 6, Bmin = 2, and  = 0:01.
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Fig. 9. The advantage of the MPOF scheme on reducing feedback resources
with M = 4,  = 4, Pb = 20 dB, Pe = 0 dB,  = 0:01, and  = 0:1.
increases as  increases. This demonstrates that under a certain
feedback rate constraint, a higher channel temporal correlation
can support a larger secrecy throughput.
C. Performance Comparison
In this subsection, we show the secrecy performance advan-
tage resulted from the MPOF scheme by comparing it with
the conventional one-period one-feedback (OPOF) scheme.
Specifically, we show the benefits of the MPOF scheme on
saving feedback resources and improving the secrecy through-
put in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, respectively.
Fig. 9 shows the advantage of the MPOF scheme over
the conventional OPOF scheme in terms of saving feedback
resources for secure transmission. To identify this advantage
of the MPOF scheme, in this figure we mark the specific
number of feedback bits the OPOF scheme needs when it
achieves the secrecy throughput performance close to the
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Fig. 10. The advantage of the MPOF scheme on improving network secrecy
throughput with M = 16,  = 4, Pb = 20 dB, Pe = 0 dB, Btotal = 40,
 = 0:9,  = 0:01, and  = 0:1.
MPOF scheme. We observe from this figure that compared
to the OPOF scheme, the MPOF scheme has a significant
increase in feedback bits reduction. Furthermore, this increase
becomes more profound as  increases, i.e., a higher  means
saving more feedback bits. In particular, under the given
parameters of this figure, we find that  = 0:90 equivalently
saves 3 bits, and  = 0:95 equivalently saves 5 bits. This figure
highlights that the MPOF scheme is capable of exploiting
the benefits of channel temporal correlation for the secure
transmission with reduced feedback bits.
Fig. 10 focuses on a practical IoT scenario and shows the
advantage of the MPOF scheme over the conventional OPOF
scheme in terms of improving the network secrecy throughput.
To be specific, we consider the homogeneous IoT downlink
network, where the central controller exploits the zero-forcing
beamforming to simultaneously serve K legitimate users, and
uses the remaining M   K spatial dimensions to send AN
for confusing eavesdroppers. We observe from this figure that
compared to the conventional scheme, our proposed scheme
achieves a significant increase in the network secrecy through-
put when K  2. Due to this advantage, it is safe to conclude
that the MPOF scheme is well suited for IoT networks where
the high channel temporal correlation is quite common but the
feedback resources are extremely limited.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we concentrated on implementing physical
layer security to safeguard the downlink transmission of the
IoT applications. In particular, we designed a secure on-off
transmission scheme with low complexity and small require-
ments on the feedback overhead. The key innovation of this
design is a novel feedback scheme, which is able to integrate
the feedback resources of multiple coherence periods for CSIT
acquisition. Based on this feedback scheme, we developed an
on-off-based secure transmission design and then proposed a
BCD-based one-dimensional search method to maximize the
secrecy throughput. Numerical results showed that our secure
transmission design would significantly improve the secrecy
throughput or reduce the feedback overhead, by utilizing the
channel temporal correlation existing in the IoT scenarios.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Aided by (3), we establish the general relationship between
hk and h0 as hk = kh0 +
p
1  2ke, where e 2 C1M
has i.i.d complex Gaussian random entires with zero mean and
unit variance. As such, Efjhkcy0j2g is formulated as
E
n
jhkcy0j2
o
= E
n
j(kh0 +
p
1  2ke)cy0j2
o
= 2kE
n
jh0cy0j2
o
+
 
1  2kEnjecy0j2o ; (55)
It follows that h0 and e are independent and have zero mean,
thus the expectations for all cross-terms, e.g., Efc0hy0ecy0g and
Efc0eyh0cy0g, become zero [26].
Since e is independent of the unit-norm vector c0, we have
ecy0  CN (0; 1), such that Efjecy0j2g = 1. Moreover, using
the independence between the direction knowledge and the
amplitude knowledge [35], we have
E
n
jh0cy0j2
o
= Efkh0k2gE

cos20
	
(56)
and
E
n
jhkcy0j2
o
= E fkhkk2gE

cos2k
	
; (57)
where the amplitudes satisfy
Efkh0k2g = Efkhkk2g =M: (58)
By substituting (56), (57) and (58) into (55), we derive
E

cos2k
	
as
E

cos2k
	
= 2kE

cos20
	
+
1  2k
M
: (59)
On the other hand, aided by the CDF of cos20 and cos2k
in (10) and (11), we derive E

cos20
	
and E

cos2k
	
as
E

cos20
	
= 1   1 M 1 "0; (60)
and
E

cos2k
	
= 1   1 M 1 "k; (61)
respectively. By substituting (60) into (59), we can formulate
E

cos2k
	
as another form, given by
E

cos2k
	
= 2k
 
1   1 M 1 "0+ (1  2k)M 1
= 2k
 
1 M 1    1 M 1 "0+M 1
= 2k
 
1 M 1 (1  "0)   1 M 1+ 1
= 1   1 M 1  1  2k (1  "0) : (62)
Comparing (62) with (61), we conclude that "k can be formu-
lated as (12) in Lemma 1.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For simplicity of the notations, we omit k from (k) in
the following proof. Note that the definition of  produces
that Fe;k() = 1  , which yields

(; k) + C = 0 (63)
where

(; k) = (1 + k)
M 1( + (M   1)k); (64)
and C = =ln (1  ). Using the derivative rule for implicit
functions, we first derive the first-order derivative of  on k
as

0
=
d
dk
=  @
=@k
@
=@
= K(; k) + L(; k); (65)
where K(; k) and L(; k) are respectively expressed as
K(; k) =   (M   1)
1 + (M   1)k (66)
and
L(; k) =   (M 1)
2
(1+(M 1)k) (+(M 1+)k) : (67)
Obviously, ddk < 0 always holds, i.e.,  is a decreasing func-
tion of k. Based on this result, we further find that K(; k)
is an increasing function of k, e.g., dK(; k)=dk > 0. To
characterize the concavity of  on k, we next investigate
the monotonicity of L(; k) on k. Specifically, we define
 = k, and re-express (63) as

(; k) + C = 0 (68)
where 
(; k) = (1 + )M 1
 
M   1 +  1k

. Using
the same method as in (65), it is not hard to find that  is
an increasing function of k. Based on a simple monotonicity
analysis, we state that L(; k) is also an increasing function
of k, e.g., dL(; k)=dk > 0. As such, we have

00
=
d
dk

d
dk

=
dK(; k)
dk
+
dL(; k)
dk
> 0; (69)
and conclude that  is a decreasing and convex function of
k in Lemma 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
By observing (31a) and (31b), it is not hard to find that the
objective function is continuously differentiable, and the fea-
sible set is closed, nonempty and convex. Since mpof(	t;)
is a bounded function, by using Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem,
we know that the optimization variables (e.g., 	t and ) must
have limit points, as long as mpof(	t;) is a monotonically
nondecreasing function. Mathematically, we should prove the
following relationship
mpof(	t[n];[n])  mpof(	t[n  1];[n  1]): (70)
We find that (70) is easy to prove in accordance with the
properties of the saddle points, yielding
mpof(	t[n];[n])  mpof(	t[n];[n  1])
 mpof(	t[n  1];[n  1]): (71)
By invoking ( [36], Corollary 2), we state that every limit point
obtained by Algorithm 1 is a stationary point of Problem 2.
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